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Il lavoro ha l’obiettivo di sviluppare un modello teorico diretto ad analizzare la
dinamica delle migrazioni all’interno di un paese e i loro effetti sulle disparità regionali.
Importanti caratteristiche delle migrazioni interne non trovano spiegazione nella
letteratura esistente, che generalmente attribuisce i flussi migratori a differenze nei salari
reali. L’evidenza empirica, infatti, mostra che solo le componenti della popolazione con più
alto livello d’istruzione, che sono generalmente più mobili, migrano dalle regioni più povere
alle regioni più ricche, dove il livello dei salari è più elevato; i lavoratori con più basso
livello d’istruzione, invece, talora migrano dalle regioni ricche alle regioni relativamente più
povere.
Il lavoro suggerisce che l’alto tasso di mobilità dei lavoratori con elevato livello di
istruzione è dovuto al fatto che il loro capitale umano è meglio remunerato nelle regioni
dove maggiore è la dotazione di capitale umano, grazie all’esistenza di complementarità tra i
lavoratori all’interno di una regione.
La complementarità tra i lavoratori impiegati all’interno di una regione aumenta la
produttività nel settore dei beni commerciabili nelle regioni più ricche di capitale umano; dal
momento che al crescere della produttività in questo settore aumenta il prezzo d’equilibrio
dei beni e dei servizi non commerciabili, emergono incentivi per i lavoratori con più basso
livello d’istruzione a migrare verso le regioni meno produttive. Infatti, i lavoratori
scarsamente dotati di capitale umano beneficiano in misura minore dell’esternalità positiva
dovuta alla concentrazione di capitale umano, ma devono sopportare il costo più elevato dei
beni e servizi che ne consegue.
A causa dei flussi migratori all’origine delle differenze di produttività, le disparità
regionali sono persistenti nello stato stazionario del modello e non si ha alcun processo di
convergenza, così come si è osservato all’interno di alcuni paesi dell’Unione europea dalla





Why are skilled workers more mobile than average? What determines positive
migration flows toward relatively poorer regions or states of a country? How can one explain
the sharp decrease in the mobility rate observed within European countries notwithstanding
persistent regional disparities?
This paper aims to answer these questions using skill complementarities and
endogenous price differentials between the richest and the poorest regions. If the skill
premium is increasing in the average level of human capital of a location, and the price of
non-traded goods is higher in the more human capital intensive regions, the more skilled the
workers are, the stronger are the economic incentives to migrate towards the richest regions.
In contrast, the least skilled workers have an incentive to migrate to the poorest regions to
minimize their living costs.
In this context, interregional cost-of-living differentials arise endogenously if the self-
selection of migrants affects total factor productivity in the traded goods sector, as pointed
out by Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964). Moreover, if the process of capital
accumulation provokes faster convergence in interregional wage differentials than in living
costs, convergence in per capita GDP may hinder migration to the richest regions, even if it




3. A simple model of migration decisions and productivity differentials..............................12
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￿
Why are skilled and educated workers more mobile than average? What determines
positive migration flows toward relatively poorer regions or states of a country? How can
one explain the sharp decrease in the mobility rate observed within European countries
notwithstanding persistent regional disparities?
In this paper, I suggest that skill complementarities among workers employed in the
same location and cost-of-living differentials can help explain these unresolved puzzles on
internal migration. I show that if the skill premium is increasing in the average level of
human capital of a location and there are endogenous differences in the price of non-traded
goods, the more skilled the workers are, the stronger the economic incentives to migrate
towards the richest regions will be. In contrast, the least skilled workers have an incentive to
migrate to the poorest regions to minimize their living costs.
But what explains interregional cost-of-living differentials? I suggest that if the self-
selection of migrants affects total factor productivity in the traded goods sector, differences
in the price of non-traded goods arise endogenously, as pointed out by Balassa (1964) and
Samuelson (1964).  I also show that convergence in per capita GDP may hinder migration to
the richest regions, even if it is incomplete and leaves large regional disparities. This
happens if the process of capital accumulation provokes faster convergence in interregional
wage differentials than in living costs.
  Migration choices are modeled using a two-location overlapping generations model,
as in Galor (1986). However, the context is very different. Galor studies international labor
migration between two countries with different rates of time preference. In contrast, I
assume that the two locations are identical ex ante, with the exception of the initial level of
capital intensity, and introduce a further element of heterogeneity among workers. Among
workers born in a location, skill levels are different and, therefore, also their labor
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productivity. This creates different incentives to migrate even for workers born in the same
location at the same time.
Moreover, the model incorporates skill complementarities, so that steady state
equilibria with asymmetric distribution of skills may arise even if the locations are ex ante
identical. In this respect, this paper is close to the studies that point out the existence of skill
complementarities and local externalities due to the concentration of human capital to
explain the persistency of productivity differentials among countries or regions and the lack
of convergence in per capita income. In a seminal paper, Lucas (1988) uses differences in
the average level of human capital to explain growth differentials. The microeconomic
foundation of this external effect of human capital is the sharing of knowledge and skills
among workers that occurs through both formal and informal interaction. Random meetings
which take place with higher probability within a limited geographic area favor the “cross-
fertilization” of ideas that is the engine of growth in Lucas’s framework. A related point is
made by Kremer (1993). In order to explain productivity differentials, he assumes a
production function in which the productivity of each worker depends on other workers’
ability whatever is his/her ability. According to Kremer’s interpretation, the production
process comprises many tasks, all of which must be successfully completed for the product
to have full value, and skill refers to the probability that a worker will successfully complete
a task. Under these conditions, it is optimal to put high-skill workers together. Moreover,
total factor productivity and, therefore, wages and output are a steeply increasing function of
skills.
 My contribution is to show that skill complementarities and local externalities arising
from the concentration of human capital may also account for the high mobility rate of
talented workers. If there are skill complementarities, very talented workers face strong
incentives to migrate where most talented workers are concentrated, because the skill
premium is higher. If migration costs are high or there are huge differences in the relative
price of facilities, especially housing, only individuals who expect large increases in their
wages will move to the most productive regions. Otherwise, the wage gain from migrating is
offset by the higher costs of facilities in the richest regions, and it may even be advantageous
to move to relatively poorer and low-cost locations.9
The model also has important implications for the effects of migration on regional
convergence. The productivity differentials that arise endogenously because of the self-
selection of migrants interrupts the process of regional convergence and permit poverty traps
to arise, as in Azariadis and Drazen (1990). Therefore, in my model migration hinders
convergence as in Faini (1996). However, the explanation is very different. In Faini’s paper
migration provokes regional divergence because it does not allow the marginal productivity
of capital to decrease in the initially wealthier location and the issue of self-selection of
migrants is not addressed. In the model presented here, the convergence process is arrested
because the self-selections of migrants makes differences in total factor productivity arise
and, therefore, the possibility of poverty traps emerges.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes a number of unexplained
features of internal migration. Sections 3 and 4 describe the long-run equilibria and the
transitional dynamics of the model respectively. Conclusions follow in Section 5.
6W\OL]HGIDFWV
This section summarizes a number of unexplained features of internal migration,
which suggest the importance of skill complementarities and living-cost differentials in
explaining this phenomenon.
The first striking fact is the remarkably higher mobility rate of skilled workers
relatively to the average mobility rate of the population. This is evident if one looks at the
experience of Southern Europe, especially, Italy and Spain. Despite the pronounced regional
disparities existing within these two countries, in the last two decades the rate of internal
migration has been very low and, as noticed by 7KH(FRQRPLVW in its “Survey on Italy” of
November 1998, limited to the most talented and skilled young people who move to the
richest regions. Figures 1.a-1.b and 2.a-2.b show clearly that the low average migration rate
across the regions
2 of these two countries hides the high migration rate of the most educated
components. If, as is common practice, skills are proxied with educational attainments, one
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can claim that the most skilled components of the population are also the most mobile.
Borjas, Bronaras and Trejo (1992) present evidence that on average movers are more skilled
than non-movers in the US as well.
Different skill levels influence not only the propensity to move, but also the direction
of migrant flows. In particular, the richest cities and regions seem to attract especially skilled
workers. Borjas, Bronaras and Trejo (1992), for instance, notice that in the US the most
skilled workers move to the states where wage dispersion and skill remuneration are highest,
while the contrary is true for less skilled ones. These authors also present evidence that the
skill endowments of different locations have an important influence on the direction of
internal migration flows, with skilled workers migrating where the concentration of human
capital is highest. This suggests another unexplained puzzle of the pattern of internal
migration that regards the direction of migrant flows. Although any neoclassical model
would predict that individuals should migrate to the richest regions until real wages are
equalized, this is not the case. Even if the richest regions are often those with positive net
migration flows, gross migration flows are significant in both directions. Therefore, for a full
comprehension of internal migration it seems necessary to take this feature into account as
well. This is even more important when one looks at European data, since in the eighties and
the nineties population in Europe appears scarcely responsive to economic incentives in
taking migration decisions. Spain is the most enlightening example. The Spanish regions
with the highest net inflows of migrants over the period 1988-1992 are not the richest ones.
Migrants seem to go mostly to Comunidad Valenciana and Canaries and only after these to
the richer Baleares, Madrid and Catalunya. Moreover, in addition to the relatively poorer
Castilla y Leon and Extremadura, they also leave the relatively rich Pais Vasco
3. Some
descriptive statistics on the regions with the greatest migration inflows and outflows are
presented in Tables 1.a-1.c. On average regions receiving net migration inflows are well off
in terms of per capita GDP, rate of unemployment, importance of the industrial sector in the
GDP and endowment of human capital, even if they are not the most developed regions. This
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raises questions as to why migrants do not respond to what are usually considered the
economic incentives to migrate.
Moreover, if one looks at the net inflows of the most educated workers, the richest
regions Baleares, Madrid and Catalunya, which have a significantly above the average
endowment of skilled population, are among the four regions with the highest net inflows
(still surprisingly, with the Canaries). Hence, even in the Spanish case there is evidence that
skilled workers move to the richest regions where the average level of human capital
measured by the educational attainment of resident population is also higher. If skilled
workers are attracted by locations with a high concentration of human capital because of
skill complementarities, what incentives might less skilled workers have to move to poor and
high unemployment regions, like Aragon and Andalusia, as noted by Antolin and Bover
(1997)? These authors draw on survey data to conclude that people move mainly in search of
cheaper housing and better quality of life. This seems to be confirmed by regional
consumption price indices, which are significantly lower-than-average in poorer regions
4.
The sharp living-cost differentials between the Center-North and the South may have
been a deterrent to migration in Italy as well. Although in Italy, as shown in tables 2.a-2.c,
the poorest Southern regions are also those with highest net out-migration, only the most
educated individuals migrate.  In an empirical study, Giannetti (1999) shows that the
migration of workers with different endowments of human capital among Italian regions has
very different determinants and that a high concentration of skilled people in a region is a
major pull factor for skilled workers alone.
The negative effect on mobility arising from cost-of-living differentials and,
especially, housing prices has also been documented for Britain by Cameron and Muellbauer
(1998), who interpret the sharp decline in 1987-89 in the migration to the South-East as
prima facie evidence for strong discouragement from high relative housing prices. Indeed,
the eighties were characterized by a housing price boom in the South-East.
Finally, one should notice that the mobility rate has sharply decreased since the mid-
seventies in Italy as well as in Britain and Spain despite persistent income and
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unemployment differentials. Pissarides and Wadsworth (1989) and Bentolila (1997) attribute
this trend to the increase in the national rate of unemployment, which decreases the
probability of finding a job in another region and reduces the benefits of migration. This
argument, though, does not provide any explanation for the high mobility of the most skilled
workers and the self-selection of migrants. The argument of Faini and Venturini (1994), who
suggest that the relationship between migration and income is non-linear and, therefore, an
increase in the standard of living may reduce mobility, suffers from the same problem.
Can the evolution of cost-of-living differentials and skill premia explain the reduction
in mobility rates, besides the different behavior of individuals with different endowments of
human capital? In Section 4 I show that this may be the case. In the sixties and the early
seventies, European countries experienced a process of convergence that has left large
internal regional disparities, which would not justify the sharp decrease in net migration
toward the wealthiest regions. Section 4 shows how convergence in capital intensities across
regions may hinder migration to the North if it causes faster convergence in wage
differentials than in living costs.
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This section studies migration decisions under the assumption that the skill premium is
increasing in the average level of human capital of a location, owing to the existence of skill
complementarities. The empirical relevance of skill complementarities and the positive
externalities deriving from the concentration of human capital have been documented in a
number of empirical studies, such as Rauch (1991). When one takes skill complementarities
into account, I show that it is straightforward to account for the higher-than-average mobility
rate of the most skilled workers. In fact, if there are fixed migration costs, only individuals
who benefit most from high skill premia find it optimal to migrate to regions where the
average level of human capital is higher.
However, if one takes into account the general equilibrium effects of differences in
total factor productivity originating from differences in the average level of human capital,
the flows of the least skilled migrants to the poorest regions can also be explained. If the13
self-selection of migrants affects total factor productivity in the traded goods sector,
differences in the price of non-traded goods arise endogenously, as pointed out by Balassa
(1964) and Samuelson
5 (1964). In fact, if the total factor productivity in the traded goods
sector is an increasing function of the average skill level of a region, the price of non-traded
goods is higher in regions where the most skilled workers reside
6. In turn, this reduces the
incentive for the least skilled workers to migrate to the richest regions. Furthermore, if
preferences are non-homothetic and individuals with lower income spend relatively more to
satisfy their basic living expenditures, whose prices differ across regions because they
include non-traded goods, such as housing, in equilibrium the least skilled workers may have
an incentive to move to the poorest regions in order to minimize their living costs. In this
way, one can explain two of the most important features of internal migration without
positing any imbedded preference to remain in the region of origin or having depopulation of
the poorer regions, as most of the existing literature (see, for instance, Bertola, 1993 and
Faini, 1996).
I study internal migration within a country with two regions, the North (1) and the
South (6). Workers may decide to establish their activity in either of the two regions.
  First, I describe the two locations and their inhabitants and then the production
technology.
I rely on a simple overlapping generation framework with infinite periods. The
demography is described as follows. During each period, a two-period lived generation of
workers is born. Each generation consists of a continuum of workers, whose mass may
eventually differ across regions
7. The aggregate mass of the population is 3. Workers are
heterogeneous, since they differ in their skill level. Each worker is endowed with one unit of
labor, but skill differentiates workers’ endowments of efficiency units of labor services. A
worker of type L has skills VL . This is equivalent to saying that she is endowed with VL  units
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of labor services. Skills are drawn from a fixed distribution with c.d.f.  ] 1 , 0 [ : ®
+ 5 ) , which
is equal across regions
8. Hence, the average skill level of workers is equal across regions
before migration decisions are taken.
The existence of a continuum of workers is a simplifying assumption that allows us to
study aggregate implications of skill complementarities without worrying about strategic
interaction among migrants, and ensures that the entire distribution ) is always fully
represented.
The agents of this economy live two periods: they decide where to live when they are
born, work in the first period of their life and consume in both periods. The preferences of an
individual of type L, who is young at time W, are represented by the following utility function,
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The utility of an individual of type L born at time W is increasing and linear in the
consumption of traded good (<) at time W and W, 
W
L W \ & , ,  and 
W
L W \ & , 1 , +  respectively; b  is the
intertemporal discount rate, which is equal to the international interest rate, r. Utility is
defined for values of consumption of non-traded good ; above the basic living expenditures,
[ &
9. For simplicity’s sake I consider only consumption of non-traded goods at time W, 
W
L W [ & , , ,
but all the results remain unchanged if consumption of non-traded goods over the two
periods of life is used to define basic living expenditures.
According to this utility function, consumers derive positive utility only from income
net of living costs, which differ according to the region of residence. As a consequence of
the non-homotheticity of preferences, poor consumers have a smaller portion of their budget
left over after satisfying basic living expenditures to save and consume at their discretion.
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This assumption reflects the fact that there are some basic expenditures, such as housing
10,
which constitute a bigger share of expenditure for individuals with lower income and whose
cost may differ across regions.
As is shown below, this has important implications on migration decisions, because
least skilled consumers are consequently better off living in low-cost, low-productivity
regions. Moreover, the results would not be affected if one explicitly considered that
consumption of non-traded goods increases with income, although the algebra would be
considerably more complicated when one studies the convergence to the steady state in
Section 4.
Different types of agents differ only in their budget constraint. The wage
rate, ) , (
U
W L V V Z , depends on their skills and location. In fact, workers’ remuneration depends
positively not only on their own skills, VL , but also on the average level of skills of other
workers employed in the same location at time W, 
U
W V . This means that skills of individuals
employed in the same location are complementary
11. As shown below, these skill
complementarities determine a strategic complementarity in the location decisions of
workers and, as a result, multiple steady states arise in the model, as pointed out by Cooper
and John (1988).
Government lump sum transfers among individuals of different types belonging to the
same generation,  WL 7 , guarantee that each individual can afford at least her basic living
expenditures. This assumption is grounded on the fact that there are subsidies for poorer and
less skilled individuals, which are homogeneous within a country and do not take into
account regional price differentials. Sometimes, as in Spain, these subsidies are higher in less
developed regions and this, of course, reinforces the incentive to migrate to poorer regions.
                                                          
10 The basic living expenditures whose cost differs across regions may also include goods, such as food.
Although this is commonly considered a traded good, its price differs across locations because it also includes
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basic living expenditures may be used for true traded goods, such as travel or the accumulation of financial
wealth.
11 See Rauch (1991) for empirical evidence on this point.16
In what follows, I show that even without distortive taxation, there may be economic
incentives to migrate to poorer and low-productivity locations.
Each worker is endowed with one unit of labor that she offers inelastically and can
borrow and lend at the international interest rate. The price of the traded good is normalized
to 1, and the initial holdings of foreign bonds and capital are equal to zero.
Under these assumptions, the intertemporal budget constraint of an individual with
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The disposable income to buy traded goods is equal to the wage rate minus the basic
living expenditures in region U
U
W & S plus the government transfers,  (which could be
negative),  WL 7 , and the profits of the production sector of the economy, 
I W , which are
distributed equally among all workers.
To differentiate the natives of region U from the immigrants, I assume that any worker
who migrates from region M to region U incurs a fixed migration cost &
￿￿. Hence, the
intertemporal budget constraint of an individual with skill  L V , born at time W in region M and
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To maximize their utility, agents will locate in the region where they can enjoy higher
consumption of traded goods. Therefore, agents will choose the location that guarantees
higher income net of any moving costs and non-traded good expenditures.
On the production side, there are two sectors producing traded and non-traded goods.
Both sectors employ capital, ., and labor services, /. Output depends on the efficiency units
of labor services, which are determined by workers’ skill level, and not on the mass of17
workers that are employed. In fact, workers differ in the efficient units of labor services they
are endowed with. Total factor productivity in the traded goods sector also depends on the
average skill level of workers employed in the region. Intuitively, firms’ productivity is
higher if there are good consultants and reliable firms providing intermediates and other
supplies nearby
13. In this respect, the production function of the traded goods sector may be
regarded as a version of the “o-ring” production function
14 introduced by Kremer (1993). In
this way, I formalize the positive externalities generated by the concentration of skilled
workers, which have been found in several empirical studies (See, for instance, Rauch,
1991). Alternatively, regional differences in technology may be imputed to directed
technical change, as suggested by Acemoglu (1998). In this case, the region, where the
concentration of skilled workers is higher optimally adopts technologies, which increase the
productivity of the most skilled workers relative to the least skilled ones. In this case as well,
complementarities among high skill workers are the driving force of regional skill premia
differentials, because this would not emerge if skill biased technological change did proceed
at the same pace in both regions.
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W <  and 
U
W ;  are the output levels of the traded and non-traded goods sectors
respectively in region Uwhere  } , {   6 1 U Î , at time W.  The output of the traded goods sector
can either be used as a consumption good or transformed into a capital good, while the
output of the non-traded sector can only be used as a consumption good. Moreover, I assume
that the production of the traded good is relatively more capital intensive. In terms of the
                                                                                                                                                                                  
12 One may think of & as a quantity of traded good that is lost because of migration.
13 This element seems to be important in determining firms’ profitability. In fact, in a number of surveys
conducted by the European Commission among firms, it has been pointed out that the poor availability of legal
and consulting services figures highly among the relative factors of disadvantage in lagging regions (European
Economy, 1990).
14 In the cited paper, Kremer proposes a production function describing processes subject to mistakes in
many tasks and refers to the example of the space shuttle &KDOOHQJHU, whose explosion was caused by the
malfunction of one of this components (the O-ring). That is why he talks of O-Ring production function.18
parameters of the model, this implies:  n a > . This assumption relies on the fact that the non-
traded goods sector comprises a larger proportion of services production, which is less
capital intensive than goods production.
Firms maximize profits taking factor and output prices as given. There is a firm for
each sector in each region and firms property is equally distributed among all the consumers
in the economy, who receive firms’ profits. Per capita profits of firms producing good Min
region U are:
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U 6  is the support of the distribution of skills in region U
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Profits are equally distributed to the young generation, which has mass 3. As is always the
case with constant returns to scale production functions, profits will be equal to zero in
equilibrium.
Labor is fully employed in both regions, and factors can move freely across sectors and
regions. Moreover, I assume that the economy is open to capital flows and the economy is
relatively small so that the interest rate is fixed at its world level, r. Under these
assumptions, which will be relaxed in the next section, the economy is always in steady state
and there is no transitional dynamics. In what follows, I refer to steady state variables by
omitting time subscripts. Moreover, the relevant variables are presented per unit of
efficiency of labor services, rather than per worker, because labor services, and not the mass
of workers, are the relevant input.
The steady-state equilibrium capital per unit of efficiency of labor services in the
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Since labor is perfectly mobile across sectors, the price of non-traded goods in region U
















































Therefore, the actual remuneration of a worker endowed with VL  efficiency units of
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The remuneration of a worker with skill  L V  in region Uis an increasing function of his
own skill, VL , and of the average skill level of the region where he works, 
U V  which, of
course, depends on migrants’ skills. Strategic complementarities arise from the interaction of
individual and regional average skill levels because the cross-derivative,  U
LV V Z , is positive.
All variables depend in equilibrium on the average skill level of the population of
region U. Therefore, to describe fully the steady state equilibrium it is necessary to establish
how this is determined.
As previously noted, a worker with skills VU migrates from region M to region U if her
income net of migration costs and expenditure on non-traded goods guarantees higher
consumption of traded goods.
Formally, workers migrate from region M to region U if the following inequality is
satisfied:
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A symmetric steady state equilibrium, in which no skilled worker migrates from the
region of origin, always exists. No one migrates if she expects that the average skill level of
the workers active in each region are equal, that is if 
U M V V = . In this case, the total factor
productivity in the non-traded sector remains equal in the two regions, and neither wage nor
price differentials emerge. Inequality [1] is never satisfied so that no one actually finds it
optimal to migrate.
However, since skills are strategic complements, this does not need to be the unique
steady state equilibrium. If a worker expects the most skilled workers born in region Mto
migrate to region U he may find it optimal to move to region U as well, because her own
productivity is increasing in the average skill level of workers producing in the same
location. If all workers share the same expectations in equilibrium, skills may be
asymmetrically distributed between the two regions, even if these are symmetric ex ante. In
fact, not only is the productivity of a skilled worker increasing in her own skill level, but also
the difference between the productivity of a worker employed in the North and one
employed in the South is increasing in the skill level of this worker. This means that, for
given beliefs about the distribution of skills between the two regions, the more skilled the
workers are, the more beneficial it is to move to the location with the higher concentration of
skills.
Moreover, if past history influences workers’ beliefs and the distribution of skills in
the past was uneven, the asymmetric equilibrium may become the focal point of this
“coordination game” among workers.
Let’s assume without loss of generality that, if an asymmetric equilibrium emerges, the
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Notice that V and V  depend on the wage rate and, therefore, on the capital stock
employed in production in each region, in addition to total factor productivity, which is equal22
to the regional endowment of human capital. However, in a steady state the capital stock
depends on the average skill level of region U.  Therefore, the solution of the equations in
Proposition 1, part LLL implies solving a system of simultaneous equations in 
1 V  and 
6 V .
In an asymmetric equilibrium, the most skilled workers in the more productive region
receive a skill premium that is high enough to compensate the higher cost of living plus
migration costs. Hence, one observes a significant flow of the most skilled and educated
workers towards the richest and highest-cost regions, as in Italy or the US. In contrast, the
least skilled workers have an incentive to move from the most productive region to the less
productive one, because the skill premium they receive is not sufficient to compensate the
higher cost of living in the North. Workers with intermediate levels of skills prefer not to
move from the region of origin in order not to spend the fixed migration cost, since the
difference in skill remuneration between the two regions just about compensates the
difference in living costs.
The observed net migration flows depend on the distribution of skills in the population.
For instance, the fact that the mobility rate is lower in Spain than in Italy and there are higher
flows towards the poorest regions may be explained by differences in the composition of
population. In fact, while Italian residents with at least a high school diploma account for
11% of the overall population in 1980 (20% in 1992), in Spain the percentage of skilled
workers according to this definition was only 5% in 1980 (8% in 1992).
Government transfers have an important role in explaining why the results of the
model do not apply to international migrations. For instance, why do unskilled workers not
migrate from the US to Mexico to minimize their living expenditures? Besides the fact that
migration costs are presumably higher, government support is very likely greater in their
home country and this changes migration incentives. By contrast, why does one observe
conspicuous flows of migrants from the poorest to the richest countries? Besides differences
in technology that may introduce differences in labor remuneration for any skill level,
inhabitants of countries at different stages of development differ substantially in what they
consider basic living expenditures. In this case, the mechanism that passes through
differences in living costs and hinders migration flows is weakened, and significant flows of
labor become possible.23
If taxes/subsidies are proportional to income rather than lump sum, the incentive to
migrate to the richest regions is even lower, since workers cannot benefit completely from
the higher skill premium.
The self-selection of migrants has clear implications for regional disparities. Per capita
GDP in the North is higher, not only because the most productive workers, who receive
higher wages, are in the North, but also because the self-selection of migrants increases total
factor productivity in the traded goods sector in the North and decreases it in the South.
The results have been derived under the simplifying assumption that population size is
not affected by migration flows. However, the results of the model are completely
unchanged if migration affects the population size (the mass of the new generation) without
modifying the distribution of skills. By contrast, if newborns inherited the skill level from
their parents, the distribution of skills in the new generation would depend on the
characteristics of individuals working in the region during the previous period. In this case, it
could happen that the new generation born in the region losing its more skilled workers is
less skilled and migration flows decrease because of this endogenous change in the
distribution of skills that also accentuates regional disparities. However, if one thinks that
skills depend not only on education but also on innate ability (presumably correlated with
educational achievements) the assumption does not appear too restrictive and allows us to
focus on the consequences of self-selection of migrants on uneven development.
In what follows, I show that the decrease in the mobility rate may also be the result of
the process of capital accumulation and partial regional convergence, assuming that the
distribution of skills is unchanged by migration and that an asymmetric equilibrium exists.
The dynamics of migration decisions is analyzed as the two regions’ per capita GDP
converges because of the process of capital deepening. In order to do so, it is necessary to
introduce dynamics in the model, which I do in the next section.
7KHG\QDPLFVRIPLJUDWLRQDQGFRQYHUJHQFH
The asymmetric steady state of the model with skill complementarities and
endogenous price differentials can account for the pattern of migration observed within the24
European Union in the eighties. The model showed that a steady state, in which only the
most skilled workers are responsive to differences in productivity and, therefore, to real
wages differentials, is perfectly consistent with economic rationality if the skill premium is
increasing in the average skill level and basic living costs differ across regions. However, the
“static” version of the model does not explain why the mobility rate within the European
countries decreased sharply over the eighties, despite the fact that the process of regional
convergence was not completed and in fact came to an halt in those years.
In order to examine this issue, this section studies the dynamics of migration as the
process of capital accumulation proceeds in the two regions of the economy. To study the
interaction of migration flows with the process of capital deepening, it is necessary to
introduce dynamics into the model. Hence, I introduce adjustment costs, which are a








1 - + f . The
reader should consider that it is costly for the economy to change the capital intensity of the
technique of production and that these costs are born by each firm. In this way, the model
has a transitional dynamics and does not jump immediately to the steady state, as in the
previous section, even if capital can flow freely into the economy.
I study migration flows as the economy converges to an asymmetric steady state and
regional convergence is occurring. In this context, which accurately represents the
experiences of Italy and Spain, I investigate if and under what conditions the model
presented in the previous section can account for the dramatic change in the observed pattern
of migration.
To avoid indeterminacy problems due to the interdependence of investment and
migrations decisions, it is necessary to assume that that total factor productivity in the traded
good sector at time W depends on the average skill level of workers employed in that region at
W. In this way, when firms invest, total factor productivity in the traded sector is given.
Migration decisions at time W are taken after investment decisions are observed. These
dynamic complementarities are often used in the literature and find empirical support (see,
for instance, Cooper and Haltiwanger, 1996). In addition, to reduce the size of the dynamic
system that describes this two-region economy, I assume that the ratio of capital intensities
in the two sectors of region U at W  is equal to the steady state ratio of capital intensities. As25
shown in the appendix (Proposition 1.A), this implies that the process of capital deepening
proceeds at the same rate in both sectors of a region. In this way, in order to study the
dynamics, one can focus on the capital per efficiency units of labor services of the traded
goods sector in region U. Therefore, for notational simplicity, the subscript \is omitted.
Finally, on the consumer side, it is necessary to modify the model in order to take into
account the fact that, since the economy is growing, the index of basic living expenditures,













 is the ratio of
nominal wages per unit of labor services to the price of non-traded goods in the South, while
g  is a constant, with a value between 0 and 1.
In order to decide next period capital per efficiency units of labor services, firms
maximize profits net of adjustment costs and the cost of capital,  r . The objective function






















+ + + f r p . Maximizing
profits, firms do not take into account the fact that a higher value of  W N  decreases adjustment
costs at W. This assumption may be justified on two grounds. First, the time horizon of
firms may be the same as that of workers, so that they do not internalize next period
adjustment costs. Alternatively, previous period capital intensity may be interpreted as an
economy-wide variable that cannot be affected by the decision of a single firm. Of course, in
equilibrium, economy-wide and individual variables must coincide.
The growth rate of capital per efficiency units of labor services in the economy is
determined according to the first order conditions for profit maximization and is:



















 From equation [2], it is clear that the growth rate of capital intensity in region U is an
increasing function of the marginal productivity of capital.
The equilibrium paths of this two-region economy are described by the capital
intensity sequences which satisfy equation [2] for both regions. However, one also needs to
take into account the fact that, in equation [2], 
U
W V  is determined according to part iii) of26
proposition 1, and, therefore, depends on capital intensity in both regions. In fact, 
U
W V  is
function of migrations decisions at W, that is, of  W V  and  W V . Migration decisions, in turn,
depend on capital intensity at time W and on the average skill level at W. In fact, the
remuneration of labor services and the price of non-traded goods depend on the current level
of capital intensity and the level of total factor productivity in the traded goods sector in
region  U, equal to the previous period average skill level in this region. Therefore,


















W V V N N K V V N N J V - - - - - - = = , where the second equality is obtained
considering that equation [2] must hold in both regions and substituting for 
1
W N  and  W N .
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with initial conditions:  .   and     ,   , 0 0 0 0
6 1 6 1 N N V V
The steady states of this dynamic system are the same as the equilibria of the economy
without transitional dynamics described in the previous section. To establish under which
conditions an asymmetric steady state of the type described in proposition 1 is locally stable,
the system is linearized around the steady state (see appendix for details). Proposition 3








Under the condition stated in Proposition 3, the regional average skill level is not
significantly affected by migrants’ skills in the neighborhood of the steady state.
/HPPD7KHHIIHFWVRIPLJUDWLRQRQWRWDOIDFWRUSURGXFWLYLW\$VVXPHWKDWWKH
GHQVLW\IXQFWLRQIDVVRFLDWHGWRWKHFGI)LVFRQWLQXRXVLQWKHQHLJKERUKRRGRIWKHVWHDG\
VWDWHYDOXHVRI V DQG V      7KHQLIWKHVXIILFLHQWFRQGLWLRQIRUVWDELOLW\VWDWHGLQSURSRVLWLRQ
KROGVWKHYDULDWLRQRI {} 6 1 U V
U
W ,   , Î , DURXQGWKHVWHDG\VWDWH FDQEHQHJOHFWHGEHFDXVHLWLV
FORVHWR]HUR
3URRIThe value of 
U
W V  linearized around the steady state can be written as follows:





















= - . As shown in the appendix carrying out the

















 can be written respectively as:

















W . Proposition 3 requires that  ) (V I  and  ) (V I  be close
enough to zero for local stability. Therefore, 
U U
W V V -  is negligible as well. This implies that
the variations of 
U
W V  between W and W are also negligible in the neighborhood of the steady
state.
  In what follows, I assume that the sufficient condition stated in Proposition 3 is
satisfied and examine the evolution of migration flows, while the system converges to an
asymmetric steady state, starting from the neighborhood of this steady state.
                                                          
15 I continue to refer to steady state variables’ values by omitting the time subscript.28
It is assumed that in W  the South has less capital per efficiency unit of labor services








R V V < .  Moreover, in order to analyze the
effects of capital deepening, I assume that the initial levels of capital per efficiency units of
labor services are lower than the steady state levels in both regions. Does convergence in the
stock of capital per efficiency units of labor services bring a change in the pattern of
migration flows as the one observed, for instance, in Italy?
In order to answer this question, it is necessary to examine the dynamics of the
variables that migration decisions depend on.
As I said, my primary objective is to study the transition dynamics toward the
asymmetric steady state under the assumption that there is convergence in capital intensity.
This happens under the conditions stated in lemmas 1 and 2.
/HPPD6XIILFLHQW&RQGLWLRQIRUFRQYHUJHQFH,ILQW WKH6RXWKLVIXUWKHUDZD\
IURP WKH VWHDG\ VWDWH WKDQ WKH 1RUWK 
1 1 6 6 N N N N 0 0 - > -  WKHQ GXULQJ WKH DGMXVWPHQW
SURFHVVWKHUHLVFRQYHUJHQFHLQWKHOHYHORIFDSLWDOLQWHQVLW\EHWZHHQWKHWZRUHJLRQV
3URRI. The previous inequality can be equivalently stated using logarithm variables as
long as 
1 6 N N < : 
1 1 6 6 N N N N 0 0 ln ln ln ln - > - . Substituting the expressions of steady states
capital intensities determined in the previous section one obtains:
()
6 1 6 1 V V N N ln ln
1
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. This implies that the marginal productivity of capital
per efficiency units of labor services is greater in the South  ) ln ) 1 ( ln (ln
6 6 N V a a - - +  than
in the North  ) ln ) 1 ( ln (ln
1 1 N V a a - - +  during the whole adjustment process, since, if the
sufficient condition for stability holds, variations in the regional average skill level may be
neglected (see lemma 1). Hence, from equation [2], it follows that the rate of growth of
capital intensity is greater in the South.
Moreover, if the sufficient condition for convergence is satisfied in t=0, it holds
throughout the adjustment process. In fact, from the solution of the dynamic system it turns
out that 
W
U U U U




































As a consequence of the convergence process, the interregional wage gap decreases





W Z Z - GHFUHDVHVGXULQJ
WKHDGMXVWPHQWSURFHVV ,W QHYHU EHFRPHV HTXDO WR ]HUR EHFDXVH LQ WKH VWHDG\ VWDWH WKH
GLVWULEXWLRQRIVNLOOVEHWZHHQ1RUWKDQG6RXWKLVDV\PPHWULF
3URRI Taking the variables in logarithm form the wage differential is:
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W Z Z - D  is negative if and only if








W N N V V a . This is always true, because based on
lemma 2 the first term is negligible, while the second is always negative under the conditions
stated in lemma 2.
On the basis of the above results one can determine the dynamics of migration flows.
To study the dynamics of migration, it is necessary to look at the path of the decision
variables, which determine migration decisions, as stated in proposition 1. In particular, it is
necessary to distinguish between migration to the North and migration to the South.
3URSRVLWLRQ0LJUDWLRQIORZVWRWKH1RUWK,IFDSLWDODFFXPXODWLRQKDVDOLPLWHG
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 is increasing over time. It is shown in the appendix that this sufficient condition
holds as long as differences in factor intensities in the two sectors are not too pronounced,
that is, if  n a - is relatively small. In fact, in this case, convergence in the price of non-
traded goods proceeds at a sufficiently slower pace than convergence in wage differentials.
Alternatively, if C is relatively high the effect of the increase in the ratio of migration
costs to the wage differential prevails over the first term and the eventually fast convergence
in the cost of living across the two regions. Therefore, the migration flow to the North
decreases in this case as well.
The difference in factor intensities between the two sectors,  n a - , plays an important
role in determining the effects of convergence on migration flows, because it measures the
degree to which an increase in capital intensity in region U is reflected in an increase in the
price of non-traded goods. If this were large, since during convergence to the asymmetric
steady state capital accumulation proceeds faster in the South, the difference in the price of
non-traded goods would decrease relatively faster than the wage differential. In fact, using
logarithms, the non-traded price differential and the wage differential may be written
respectively as:
(14)
). ln (ln ln ln ln ln
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From the above equations it is evident that the narrowing of the gap in capital
intensities across regions has a larger effect on interregional wage differentials than on non-
traded goods price differentials. This effect is more pronounced the smaller is  n a - Thus,
convergence in capital intensities may hinder migration to the North if it causes sufficiently
faster convergence in wage rates than in living costs.
Describing the long-run equilibrium of this economy, I showed that there might be
positive migration flows to the relative less productive regions as well. Proposition 5
establishes sufficient conditions under which these flows are increasing over time while the
economy converges to the asymmetric steady state and standards of living improve.31
3URSRVLWLRQ  0LJUDWLRQ IORZV WR WKH 6RXWK 0LJUDWLRQ IORZV WR WKH 6RXWK DUH
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VPDOO LQ FRPSDULVRQ WR GLIIHUHQFHV LQ OLYLQJ FRVWV DQG FRQYHUJHQFH LQ ZDJH UDWHV LV
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the linearization around the steady state, it is evident that this is possible only if fixed
migration costs are relatively small in comparison to differences in living costs. Moreover, in
order to make this possible, as in proposition 4 the increase in capital intensity must have a
limited effect on the price of non-traded goods ( n a - must be relatively small). The proof is
analogous to that for proposition 4 and is, therefore, omitted.
The existence of migration flows to the South may further reduce the net migration
flow to the richest region. Individuals with a lower skill level, who benefit less from skill
complementarities, may take advantage of lower living costs in the relatively poorer
locations. In this case, convergence in capital intensities may spur migration to the South,
because, as noted above, it leads to faster convergence in wage rates than in living costs.
The model has also interesting implications for long-run convergence in regional per
capita GDP. The self-selection of migrants generates differences in total factor productivity,
which yield an equilibrium with an asymmetric distribution of income. An initial economic
disadvantage (lower capital intensity in the model) has long-run effects because the self-
selection of migrants perpetuates the uneven distribution of skills and gives rise to a “poverty
trap”. This may explain the changing dynamics of migration and convergence within the
European Union where, as has been widely noticed (Fabiani and Pellegrini, 1997; Giannetti,
1998), not only did internal migration drop in the eighties, but also the process of regional
convergence appears to have come to a halt.
From a normative point of view, whether the concentration of the most skilled workers
and the consequent regional disparities maximize social welfare or not depends on the shape
of the distribution of skills within the population. There are two contrasting effects at work.
On the one hand, the self-selection of migrants increases total factor productivity in the32
North and this in turn increases the output of workers employed in the North. On the other
hand, the opposite is true in the South. The net effect on total output depends on whether the
increase in output in the North is larger or smaller than the decrease in the South. This
depends on the shape of the distribution of skills in the population, ).  In particular, if the
mass of workers remaining in the South is very large with respect to the mass of migrants,
the self-selection of migrants reduces aggregate GDP and, therefore, a social planner would
seek to limit migration flows. Moreover, if capital accumulation were performed by a social
planner, he or she would internalize the effect of investment today on the next period
adjustment cost of capital. Therefore, convergence to the steady state should be faster, under
assumptions on the parameters that guarantee stability as in Proposition 3.
&RQFOXVLRQV
In this paper, a model has been presented which shows how heterogeneity in migrants’
skill level and explicit consideration of living costs can help to explain some of the puzzles
surrounding internal migration.
The model has also shown how the self-selection of migrants may generate poverty
traps for regions that start from less favorable conditions, because it leads to differences in
total factor productivity in the traded goods sector. However, there is no danger of
depopulation for the poorer regions, as models that merely consider wage differentials would
forecast, because forces are at work leading unskilled workers to migrate to these regions.
The mechanisms proposed in the model may help explain the changing dynamics of
migration and convergence within the European Union where, as has been widely noted, not
only did internal migration drop during the eighties, but also the process of regional
convergence appears to have come to an halt. The dynamics of the model could be enriched
by analyzing the interaction between migration and human capital accumulation. Intuitively,
in this case the effects of the brain drain on regional disparities would be even stronger,
because incentives to invest in human capital would be stronger in the “North”, where the
skill premium is higher.33
The conclusions of the model may also have interesting policy implications when one
considers the integration of Eastern European economies into the European Union. Allowing
free mobility of labor between Eastern and Western Europe may create a poverty trap for
transition economies, since the most educated and skilled individuals would be the ones with
strongest incentives to migrate. Furthermore, Eastern Germany might be subject to the kind
of “brain drain” that has been pointed out in the model, since it is perfectly integrated with
Western Germany and what is considered basic living expenditure is likely to converge
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Source: Residential Variation Data (Estadística de Variaciones Residenciales)Table 1.a
63$1,6+5(*,216'(6&5,37,9(67$7,67,&6(1)
Per capita GDP (2) 5387.26
Rate of unemployment 18.44
Industry’s share of value added .28
Fraction of population with a Bachelor’s
degree or an upper-secondary school diploma .068
Table 1.b
63$,15(*,216:,7+7+(+,*+(671(7,00,*5$7,21(3)
Annual average net inflow of population 10599
Per capita GDP 5876.339
Rate of unemployment 16.89
Industry’s share of value added .219
Fraction of population with a Bachelor’s
degree or an upper-secondary school diploma .063
Table 1.c
63$,15(*,216:,7+7+(+,*+(671(7(0,*5$7,21(4)
Annual average net inflow of population 15207
Per capita GDP 4971.068
Rate of unemployment 21.9
Industry’s share of value added .3083384
Fraction of population with a Bachelor’s degree
or an upper-secondary school diploma .07
Source: Residential Variation Data (Estadística de Variaciones Residenciales)
(1) All data refer to 1988 with the exception of migration flows, which are an annual average over the 1988-
1992 period. (2) Per capita GDP is expressed in ECUs. (3) Comunidad Valenciana, Canaries and Baleares. (4)
Castilla y Leon, Pais Vasco and Extremadura.Table 2.a
,7$/,$15(*,216'(6&5,37,9(67$7,67,&6(1)
Per capita GDP (2) 13065.21
Rate of unemployment    7.9
Industry’s share of value added .34
Fraction of population with a Bachelor’s
degree or an upper-secondary school diploma .021
Table 2.b
,7$/<5(*,216:,7+7+(+,*+(671(7,00,*5$7,21 (3)
Annual average net inflow of population 16480
Per capita GDP 15496.16
Rate of unemployment  6.1
Industry’s share of value added .39
Fraction of population with a Bachelor’s
degree or an upper-secondary school diploma .024
Table 2.c
,7$/<5(*,216:,7+7+(+,*+(671(7(0,*5$7,21(4)
Annual average net ouflow of population 36660
Per capita GDP 9106.643
Rate of unemployment   11.7
Industry’s share of value added .26
Fraction of population with a Bachelor’s
degree or an upper-secondary school diploma .019
Source: ISTAT.
(1) All data refer to 1980 with the exception of migration flows which are an annual average over the 1980-
1992 period. (2) Per capita GDP is expressed in Italian Lire. (3) Emilia and Romagna, Toscana, Lombardia,
Lazio and Veneto. (4) Calabria, Puglia, Campania, Sicilia and Basilicata.$SSHQGL[
3URSRVLWLRQ$















0  , then the capital-labor ratio measured in efficiency units increases at the
same rate in both sectors of region r.































U S0  is an endogenous variable that can be determined by taking into account the fact
that the two sectors have a common wage rate because labor is freely mobile across sectors,
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0 , the ratio of marginal productivities
of capital in t=0, must be equal to the steady state ratio of marginal productivities of capital,
which is equal to 1. In fact, in the steady state the marginal productivity of capital must be
equal to the international interest rate, r, in both sectors.
I show that this implies that capital intensity increases at the same rate in both regions,
while the system converges to the steady state.
By way of contradiction, let us assume that the rate of growth of capital measured in

























. But this would be in contradiction with firms’ profit maximization,















, imply that capital intensity grows
faster in the sector with the higher marginal productivity.
/RFDOVWDELOLW\RIWKHG\QDPLFV\VWHPRIWKHHFRQRP\
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Notice that the current period average skill level in region r depends on capital
intensity and the past levels of the average skill level through the types of the least skilled42
individual migrating to the North, V, and the most skilled individual migrating to the South,
























































































































































W V  and 
6
W V  depend on the shape of the distribution of types, F. To be able
to draw conclusions on the stability of the dynamic system it is necessary to make some
assumptions about this distribution.
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where f is the density function associated with the cumulative density function, F.
It follows that all the terms in the last two rows may be written as  ) ( ) ( V I V I $ LM LM G + ,
where  LM $  and  LM G  depend on the parameter of the model and the steady state values of the
variables.
If  ) (V I  and  ) (V I  are sufficiently close to zero in the asymmetric steady state, the
previous matrix can be approximated by the following one, in which the last two rows are
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This matrix has eigenvalues: 
r a f
f




) 1 ( - +
, 0,0, which are all less than 1.
Therefore, the four-dimensional dynamic system associated with it is locally stable.
3URRIRI3URSRVLWLRQ
The migration flow to the North decreases as the two-region economy approaches the






























) ( ) ( ) (
) (
 



































































































This is true if:
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. This happens if C is
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, even if C
is relatively small.45
In what follows, I prove that ii) holds if  n a -  is not too large.



























S , where 
U u  is the steady state ratio
between capital intensities in the non-traded and traded goods sectors in region r.
The dynamics 
U
W Z  and 
U
W S  depend on 
U
W N  and 
U
W V , whose variations can be neglected in
the neighborhood of the steady state. Hence, continuing to linearize 
U
W Z  and 
U
W S   around the
steady state, one obtains:
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. To simplify the previous expression, it is
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n , which may




















































This is always satisfied if  n a -  is not too large, because 
6 1 S S >  in the asymmetric
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